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MARYBIGGS 
ABSTRACT 
THENATURE AND HISTORY of peer review are described and its positive 
and negative effects considered. It is concluded that although peer 
review tends to penalize innovation and nonconformity, i t  is 
indispensable to scholarly publishing. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Peer review” connotes genteel collegial cooperation, while 
“refereeing” suggests the boxing ring, the football field, the objective 
mediator pressured by impassioned opponents. Yet the terms are of ten 
used synonymously as they will be in this discussion. Though both 
collegial and objective in theory, in practice the process is corruptible 
by ignorance, timidity, envy, greed, bias, and other common sins. 
It is this gap between the ideal and the real, coupled with peer review’s 
extraordinary impact on scholars’ professional futures and immediate 
feelings, that makes i t  so controversial. Yet the real danger, and 
strength, of peer review lies not in its consequences for the authors 
reviewed but for prospective readers of their work. Can peer review, 
which should help protect access to sound ideas, actually impede 
access? If so, under what conditions, and how can these be prevented? 
Before tackling these questions, we must understand the nature 
of the process. 
HISTORY OF PEERREVIEWAND NATURE 
Essentially peer review means what i t  says: the review of a person’s 
work by one or more people qualified to be called professional peers. 
When restricted to the evaluation of research and writing, peer review 
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involves the scrutiny of grant proposals, or of article or book 
manuscripts, by two or more people with suitable subject and 
methodological expertise. These people, individually, then 
recommend acceptance, revision, or rejection to whomever controls 
the process-usually a grants administrator or editor. T h e  
recommendations are handled in various ways: from automatic 
adoption of the majority’s view to careful study of each recommen- 
dation as advisory only, followed by a relatively independent final 
judgment. I t  all depends on the particular journal’s or publisher’s 
or agency’s selection policy, which isn’t necessarily clearly 
communicated to the public. 
Here the focus will be on peer review in journal publishing, 
which differs in its details, though perhaps not in the broad issues 
raised, from peer review in grant funding and book publishing. 
Several scholars have described the history of scholarly journals, 
including, with admirable concision, sociologists Harriet Zuckerman 
and Robert K. Merton (1971). According to them, seeds of the peer 
review process were sown with the founding in 1665 of the first 
English-language scientific journal, Philosophical Transactions. The 
Council of Britain’s Royal Society, which instituted the journal, 
stipulated that prior to publication, each monthly issue should be 
“reviewed by some of the [Council] members.” The purpose, then 
as now, was to guard quality (p. 69). Over the centuries, journal 
peer review was systematized but never made uniform and was 
widespread but never universal. It is used in all disciplines, though 
with considerable variation in underlying assumptions, implemen- 
tation, and results. And, despite the long history supporting peer 
review, its value continues to be debated. 
Several journals, most of them in science and medicine, have 
published detailed explanations of their peer review practices (e.g., 
see Editorial staff, 1988, pp. 412-14; Enos, 1987; Carney & Lundberg, 
1987, p. 87; Lundberg & Carney, 1986, p. 3286; Stossel, 1985, pp. 658- 
59; Rubin & Carroll, 1981, pp. 103-04; “The Refereeing System ...,” 
1978, pp. 9-10). In a succinct monograph, Stephen Lock (1985) 
synthesized every substantial publication through the early 1980s 
dealing with peer review in medical journals. And in 1978, Michael 
Gordon (1978) reported his thorough survey, based on interviews with 
editors, of peer review methods used by thirty-two London-based 
research journals in several disciplines. Title by title, he set forth 
his findings. The validity of many of these data depends, of course, 
on the honesty, clearsightedness, and comprehensiveness of the 
editors’ presentations. Still, a good deal of anecdotal information 
and some solid research findings have appeared in print. 
To summarize: manuscripts are checked in; are usually screened- 
cursorily or carefully-in-house; and some percen tage-ranging from 
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less than half to nearly all-is sent on to two or more referees. They 
are selected according to information gathered through every 
conceivable means, from personal knowledge to “invisible college”- 
generated referrals to literature reviews to broad-scale questionnairing 
that enables “profiling” and the building of a formal referee database. 
And the information is stored in every possible way, from the editor’s 
memory to a card file to a computer. Accompanying each review 
request may be detailed evaluation guidelines, a referee’s report form 
to fill out, both, or neither. Some sort of review deadline is likely 
to be specified, though i t  may not be enforced. The time allowed 
to the referee varies. Authors’ names may or may not be disclosed 
to referees. Referees’ comments may be passed on to authors whole 
and unrevised, excerpted, paraphrased, or not at all. When deciding 
on the final disposition of a manuscript, the chief editor may work 
alone or in consultation with other editors or a board; may or may 
not feel constrained by referees’ judgments; and may or may not work 
closely with authors of basically sound, but not yet publishable, 
manuscripts. This will depend to some extent on the age, the prestige, 
the depth of the manuscript pool, the number of staff, and the sheer 
size of an annual volume of the particular journal. It will depend 
even more on the editorial understanding of the journal’s purpose- 
that is, whether i t  exists to vent all serious work of any potential 
value or to exclude all but the very best manuscripts, thereby 
guaranteeing the highest possible quality in what is published and 
the certain rejection of some worthy but middling work. Rejection 
rates, which range from less than 10 percent to more than 90 percent, 
vary in response to all of those factors-but equally influential, and 
especially interesting, is the impact of a journal’s subject matter. 
Generally speaking, humanities journals reject the largest 
proportions of submissions, social sciences the next largest, and hard 
sciences the smallest. There is, of course, great variation, and a 
particularly prestigious scientific journal, especially one of fairly 
broad subject scope, may reject most of the manuscripts i t  receives. 
For example, in 1978, The Lancet claimed a rejection rate of 83 percent 
and Nature a rate of 65 percent, which were remarkably high for 
scientific journals. However, such rejection rates are standard in even 
the less distinguished social sciences journals and would be quite 
low for any humanities journal. In the same year, Economicu and 
Mind were rejecting 90 percent of submissions and Philosophy 92 
percent (Gordon, 1978, p. 37). 
One obvious reason for these differences is the much larger 
number and size of scientific journals. But the reason for that is 
the sciences’ different attitude toward research and publication. For 
anything to remain unpublished if i t  has the slightest chance of 
contributing to the advancement of knowledge is anathema- 
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publication must occur and quickly. This attitude is shared to a 
considerable extent by social scientists, especially those in the more 
self-consciously scientific disciplines such as psychology; but it makes 
much less sense to humanists who tend to be more concerned with 
arriving at illuminating interpretations than with unearthing facts. 
John S. Rigden (1986), editor of the American Journal of Physics, 
has pointed out that: 
the humanist brings subjective criteria to the review process. The quality 
of the writing, the perceived significance of the thesis developed, the 
inherent interest of the subject, the appropriateness of the context chosen 
for the subject, and the treatment of the subject-context interaction all 
influence a recommendation ....A review that baldly states, “This looks 
all right to me,” would be unacceptable in the humanities. (p. 491) 
Also, of course, timeliness may matter less, and book publishing 
more, to the humanist. While humanists build on one another’s work, 
the procedure is usually not so linear, the link not so direct, and 
the related evidence not necessarily so exhaustively assimilated. At 
the same time, and for the same reasons, absolute factual accuracy 
and full description of methodology, while expected in the 
humanities, are far more critical in the sciences, as readers assess 
the authors’ accuracy and often plan costly research projects that 
build on the authors’ work. So, although less is screened in the 
sciences, the effectiveness of screening may be thought to matter more. 
Not surprisingly, most critiques of peer review have been written 
by scientists, with fewer by social scientists, and only an occasional 
published comment by humanists. 
Many of these critics have focused on the question of anonymity 
in peer review, or as it is typically called, using a peculiarly inapt 
metaphor-“blindness.” 
THE“BLINDNESS”CONTROVERSY 
As we shall see, peer review is censured for, among other things, 
its alleged corruption by referees’ personal loyalties and biases 
favoring well-known authors and prestigious institutions. Put 
another way, i t  is said to penalize women, minorities, the young, 
the obscure, and those affiliated with third-string colleges and 
universities (to say nothing of “independent scholars”). To solve this 
problem, or simply to forestall any suggestion that i t  exists, some 
journals “blind” their referees-that is, conceal from them the identity 
of manuscripts’ authors. When combined with the much more 
common practice of hiding referees’ names from authors, this is called 
“double-blind” peer review. Both stages of blinding have been 
questioned. 
Referees’ names are concealed allegedly to assure that their 
judgments will not be compromised by reluctance to alienate their 
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peers or, in the case of younger scholars reviewing the work of those 
older and better-known, by a natural desire to protect their 
professional futures. Manfred Kochen (1978) has pointed out that 
an eminent author who knew his work to have been substantially 
criticized by his junior might take offense (p. 241). Quite possibly 
he would dismiss both the criticism and the journal, to no good 
effect and to everyone’s detriment. Indeed, any author able to shift 
focus from the soundness of the criticism itself to the person behind 
it  may do so. 
Jean D. Wilson (1978), of the American Society for Clinical 
Investigation, has suggested that known referees might be subjected 
to “face-to-face or telephone encounters with irate authors (p. 1700). 
See also, Manheim, 1973, pp. 534-35). Michael Gordon (1978, p. 240), 
and Norval D. Glenn (1976, p. 182) are among those who have warned 
that, ordered to sign their reviews, some prospective referees would 
refuse to write any, which could create serious problems for the many 
journals that find i t  difficult to attract and retain competent reviewers. 
Payment for their service ranges from token to none with none 
prevailing, so the journal peer review system depends upon referees’ 
sense of professional obligation, generosity, and good humor. 
However, several commentators insist that, if forced to sign their 
names, referees would be more thorough and responsible and could 
be challenged directly by authors, with often fruitful results for both 
specific manuscripts and general scientific discourse (see, for example, 
Mirman, 1975, p. 837; Lindley, 1984, p. 59; Raza & Preisler, 1985, 
pp. 470-71; Nield, 1985, p. 65; Bardach, 1988, pp. 516-17); some have 
gone so far as to recommend that referees’ reports be published 
alongside the papers in question much more often than is permitted 
by the occasional symposia seen now (see, for example, Armstrong, 
1982, p. 87). Also, authors may be best able to evaluate and profit 
from criticism if they know the background of the critic (Newman, 
1966, p. 980). And if reviews were to bear their signatures, high-status, 
over-committed referees would presumably be less likely to hand off 
the chore of writing them to subordinates, unacknowledged 
(Douglas, 1985, p. 270). 
Perhaps the most eloquent opponent of referee anonymity has 
been scientist-activist Barry Commoner (1978). He sees reviewers’ 
mistakes as equal to authors’ errors in their ability to impede scientific 
progress, and, because they reflect publicly on no one’s name, as 
less likely to be corrected (p. 26). And R. Douglas Wright (1970), 
an Australian physiologist, demands: “Why should the wish to 
publish a scientific paper expose one to an assassin more completely 
protected than members of the...Mafia?” (p. 404). Still, virtually all 
journals blind authors to referees’ identities or at least leave the matter 
up to the referees if only to avoid offending them and losing their 
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service. For example, the new Journal of General Internal Medicine 
disapproves of anonymous reviews, yet only encourages-does not 
require-referees to sign them (Editorial Staff, 1988, pp. 412-14). 
Whether authors’ names should be concealed from referees is 
a question less firmly settled in practice, though surveys across a 
variety of disciplines have found that more journals do not conceal 
names than do (see, for example, Budd, 1981, pp. 77-81; Miller & 
Serzan, 1984; pp. 683-84; Weller, 1987, p. 34; Cleary & Alexander, 1988, 
pp. 1001-02). It may be difficult given authors’ tendency to self-cite 
and drop other identifying clues. And it is often asserted that in 
very small fields or “cut ting-edge” research areas, qualified referees 
will be able to guess whose work confronts them. However, Moossy 
and Moossy’s (1985) study, which found that referees for the narrowly 
focused Journal of Neuropathology and Experimental Neurology 
correctly named authors of submitted manuscripts only 34 percent 
of the time, casts doubt on this “truism” (pp. 225-28). It can also 
be argued that an author’s status and experience are not irrelevant 
to assessing the authority of his remarks, and it  is best that the referee 
know his name. 
The National Enquiry [Committee] into Scholarly Commun- 
ication (1979), formed with some fanfare over a decade ago, was 
skeptical of whether benefits accrued from authorial anonymity but 
concluded that i t  might be desirable even if i t  served only to reassure 
young, or female, or poorly “connected” authors that peer review 
was fair: “The credibility of the process is of great importance” (p. 
,48. For an opposing viewpoint, see Evans, 1986, p. 158). This is true, 
of course, because the development of new knowledge must proceed 
from what is already known, which is most widely disseminated 
through journals authenticated by peer review systems. Forward 
movement of research and analysis requires well-founded faith in 
these systems: faith that what they include has merit and what they 
exclude does not. 
THEPOSITIVEIMPACTOF PEER REVIEW ON 
INTELLECTUALFREEDOM 
Standing, theoretically, between scholarly editor and author are 
the author’s expert “peers’’-though actually few referees are perfect 
peers, having rather more or less knowledge than the author. 
Beholden, again in theory, to no one and caring about nothing but 
the value of the author’s work, referees form a defense against 
carelessness and corruption. Whether or not the editor is obliged 
to heed their advice, he certainly tends to be influenced by it. Thus 
referees protect authors from editors-from their whims, biases, and 
ignorance-and protect readers from both. This is most true, of course, 
i f  there is little editorial screening of papers to be refereed (few journals 
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send out all submissions), if referees are chosen well and objectively, 
and if they then perform well and objectively. An e l t o r  managing 
submissions alone or with the help of a small staff would soon crash 
against absolute limits of time and knowledge, with the likely result 
that, when screening manuscripts, she would seek easy cues such 
as trendmess of subject, author’s status, even hidher own friendship 
with the author. D. A. Pyke (1976), a London physician and referee, 
points out that even within his specialty of diabetes, there are vast 
areas about which he knows little-which leads him to speculate 
that the editors of Diabetes and Diabetologia use referees partly 
because, despite the narrowness of their journals’ scope, they simply 
do not know enough to evaluate all the manuscripts they receive 
(p. 117). Geneticist James V. Nee1 (1988), concerned about the effects 
of an editor’s not knowing what she or invited editorialists do not 
know, called for the extension of peer review to editorials (p. 981). 
Offering, as a group, not only diverse knowledge but wide- 
ranging backgrounds and alliances, referees are thought to inhibit 
the development of a “charmed circle” around an editor. Although 
some repetition of authors published and commonality of style and 
research approach can enrich a journal, shaping its identity, too small, 
tight, and dominant a circle of like-thinking scholars may stifle it, 
thereby closing off fresh ideas and methodologies. 
Most obviously, however, referees are employed to prevent readers 
from being damaged (and editors from being embarrassed) by the 
lssemination of untruth as fact. The most egregiously harmful results 
may be seen in professional practice-when, for example, a physician 
misdiagnoses or mistreats a patient (for examples of harmful medical 
misinformation, see Knapp, 1988, pp. 371-72; Robin 8c Burke, 1987, 
p. 253), or an educator selects the wrong approach to teaching a 
learning-disabled child. But equally essential is the prevention of 
futile, costly attempts to replicate faulty research. And, ideally, the 
peer review process sifts out what would become the trivial, useless, 
and misleading components of “information overload’’-a pheno-
menon which, in our time of proliferating publication, forms a 
peculiarly insidious constraint on intellectual freedom. Trying to 
detect which few items in the onslaught are true and crucial, readers 
may become captives to an impossible intellectual task, d t  knowing 
how to proceed, where to stop, what they are missing, or how or 
when or whether to act on what they learn. They lack confidence 
in their ability to access scholarship effectively, and, lacking 
confidence, cannot assert control, cannot be free. 
On the other hand, conscientious peer review may release ideas 
and information that would otherwise languish in an author’s desk, 
or be published with such severe deficiencies in presentation as to 
discourage or even mislead most readers. While referees are sometimes 
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criticized for demanding pointless changes, they are also lauded for 
helping authors shape poorly written manuscripts with worthy 
content into readable, persuasive, important journal articles (see, for 
example, McCartney, 1973, p. 440; Nowell, 1978, p. 844; Bailar & 
Patterson, 1985, p. 654; Last, 1985, p. 455; Spodick, 1986, p. 3862). 
Through his survey of 361 statisticians and psychologists, James V. 
Bradley (1981) discovered much discontent with referees but general 
approval of their work as advisors on revision. Seventy-two percent 
of his respondents thought they had improved their writing by 
following referees’ recommendations, while only 5 percent claimed 
to have had work degraded by referee-induced changes (pp. 32-33). 
Peer review, then, is intended to open doors and clear pathways 
for authors and readers, liberating them from editors’ biases and 
limitations; pre-screening inaccurate assertions, silly interpretations, 
and data drawn from unsound research; and facilitating the exposure 
of material that can advance their knowledge. The system ensures 
that work will be accepted based only on its merit, objectively 
determined, and guards against decisions influenced by fashion, 
friendship, and reputation. These, at least, are the justifications for 
peer review. In practice, quite different things may happen. 
NEGATIVEIMPACT REVIEWOF PEER ON 
INTELLECTUALFREEDOM 
Minor Factors 
First, peer review adds days, weeks, or, if poorly managed, even 
months to the period between manuscript submission and acceptance 
or rejection. Though publication delays are not the greatest threats 
to intellectual freedom, they become significant to authors when 
timeliness of research and the establishment of priority-that is, of 
“ownership” of a discovery-weigh heavily. The related authorial 
desire for rapid publication to support bids for promotion, tenure, 
or grants, would not, in an ideal world where research and writing 
were pursued for only their inherent satisfactions, affect the journal 
or, indeed, exist at all. However, the academic world is no closer 
to ideal than any other, and extreme delays in publication can jettison 
chances for grant funding for young scholars or even cost them their 
job; either result will, of course, greatly undermine their freedom 
to pursue their intellectual interests. 
To reader-researchers positioned outside scholarly networks or 
working in areas tangential to their usual specialties, any delay in 
publishing the new findings of others may inhibit their progress 
and place them at a disadvantage relative to colleague-competitors 
in their fields. Any constraint on access to needed information fetters 
intellectual freedom. When the constraint is perceived as unnecessary, 
BIGGSAMPACT OF PEER REVIEW 153 
it becomes intolerable, and many critics believe that peer review takes 
far longer than it  must. The number and time span of published 
discussions of this straightforward issue are surprising (see, for 
example, Newman, 1966, p. 980; Rodman, 1970, pp. 351-57; McCartney 
& Leavy, 1973, pp. 146, 287-88; Meadows, 1977, pp. 787-93; Azbel, 
1978, p. 82; Stieg, 1983, pp. 106-07; Sattelmeyer, 1989, pp. 173-77), 
as are some time-lag study findings. For example, authors of 
manuscripts published in Physical Review in the early 1980s received 
acceptances in anywhere from 16 days to 666 days, or nearly two 
years after submission; mean time lag for all manuscripts accepted 
by Physical Review and Physical Reuiew Letters (1979-1980) was 125 
days, or more than four months (Dehmer, 1982, p. 96). Brackbill and 
Korten’s (1970) survey of psychologists, taken more than ten years 
earlier, presented respondents with a list of twenty-two suggestions 
for revising journal review procedures and asked them to indicate 
agreement or disagreement with each. Strongest agreement (4.55 on 
1-5 scale) was with: “Measures should be taken to insure speedier 
review of articles” (p. 938). But John Budd (1988) found that seventy- 
four humanities journals took an average of three months to decide 
on acceptance or rejection but twelve months from acceptance to 
publication (p. 183). A second Budd (1988) survey of library and 
information science journals repeated his earlier finding that 
producing takes longer than deciding (p. 127). Still, time to acceptance 
may be especially important to the author, though not to prospective 
readers. Some journals seek ways to reduce review time-e.g., by 
computerizing selection of referees and enforcing short deadlines for 
their reports. However, as long as the number of submitted 
manuscripts remains at its present almost overwhelming level or 
(more likely) continues to grow, qualified reviewers will be in short 
supply and will continue to be so burdened that even the most 
cooperative may sometimes delay sending reports. 
Posing a more serious threat to intellectual freedom when it  
occurs, but apparently occurring only rarely, is outright referee bias. 
Though editors may be biased, too, they are carefully screened for 
their jobs, and they are known and answerable to authors and readers, 
which tends to make them avoid overt discrimination on bases other 
than quality. So while peer review may correct for editors’ biases 
as suggested earlier, it is not itself a bias-free process. At journals 
where editors accept reviewers’ recommendations more or less 
unquestioningly, there may be no corrective for their biases except, 
of course, other reviewers’ opinions. 
Often alleged, though rarely if  ever proven, is prejudice against 
women and minorities (few research projects purporting to explore 
this question have gone beyond simple tabulations of authors’ sex. 
One that did, a study of manuscript reviews for Rural Sociology, 
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“did not indicate that gender was related to editorial decision 
outcomes....” See, Warner et al., 1985, p. 618). One of the several 
reasons for “blinding” referees is to avoid this. Partly, perhaps, to 
disarm criticism of its treatment of women authors, P M L A  instituted 
blind review in 1980 (Showalter, 1984, p. 851). But even this does 
not, of course, eliminate prejudice against women- or minority-
focused research topics, which is sometimes thought to be a greater 
problem. For example, P M L A  has also been assailed for printing 
few articles about women authors (Gale, 1987, p. 8). To help right 
both inequities, special efforts have been urged to recruit female and 
minority referees (APA Committee on Women in Psychology, 1980; 
Exum, 1983, pp. 127-28). 
Also more of ten claimed than documented is clear-cut political 
bias-that is, against research or analyses obviously generated by a 
“left” or “right” viewpoint. Systematic research on this question, 
as on other questions raised by peer review, is scant. An experiment 
conducted by Abramowitz, Gomes, and Abramowitz (1975) found that 
referees, especially liberals, tended to favor work that dovetailed with 
their political sympathies. However, the evidence was not extremely 
strong, and the United States of the early 1970s may have been 
insufficiently typical of other times and places to permit 
generalization. 
Biases favoring the referee’s own institution, alma mater, or 
country have sometimes been hypothesized and would seem to be 
quite likely outgrowths of natural human weaknesses. But again, 
direct evidence is lacking, and positiue biases stir less ire than negatiue 
biases except when competition for page space is very fierce and grossly 
inferior work i s  finding print. 
Of much more concern are instances of bias describable as idea- 
based. These arise from intellectual and commercial conflicts of 
interest that compromise the referee’s objectivity and could even 
extend to “stealing” the author’s work: Steven H. Gale (1987) warns, 
“sometimes experts are the worst people to ask to serve as referees” 
(p. 12). That is, they almost invariably have strong opinions, 
sometimes quite emotionally held, about what should be studied and 
how, which findings and interpretations are plausible, who should 
be cited, how the writing should be styled, and conversely, what is 
impermissible. D. A. Pyke (1976) finds i t  necessary to caution his 
colleagues “to resist the temptation to advise acceptance of a paper 
merely because it  makes frequent (and favourable) reference to your 
own work” (p. 1118), though one would expect a sharp-eyed editor 
not to select a cited authority as a referee. In any case, references 
to a reviewer’s friends, mentors, or co-authors can easily show u p  
and may be seductive to him if the author is approving, or infuriating 
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if the author is negative. Of course the referee may also be influenced 
by affection or animosity toward the author himself if he is not 
“blinded” or is able to guess the author’s name. 
Physicists Henisch and Roy (1977) point out that in the ever 
more specialized world of the sciences, few people may be capable 
of understanding any given piece of work, so: “The chances are 
overwhelmingly that a submitted paper, handled along traditional 
lines, would go to a direct professional rival” (p. 105). And a rival 
can, if he wishes, attempt to torpedo even the strongest argument. 
In his send-up of peer reviewers’ behavior, psychologist Richard 
Nisbett (1978) writes: 
If the study engages the subjects’ interest and deals with matters that 
are important to them, then assert that the findings were obtained only 
because of the motivations or defenses that were aroused by the 
procedures ....If the study does not engage the subjects’ interest, then so 
much the better. It may be claimed that the phenomenon under study 
would not hold up  under any but the barren laboratory situations 
studied ....If the instructions to subjects were long and complicated, assert 
that the subjects probably didn’t understand them. The same criticism 
may be applied if the instructions were brief ....any reviewer worth his 
salt can think up as good a theoretical position as the author’s in a 
few minutes’ time. The author may then be criticized for failing to take 
this position into account .... (pp. 519-20) 
In the darkest scenarios painted by peer-review critics, a referee- 
rival may advocate rejection of sound work either because it disagrees 
with his preconceptions or to gain an advantage by undercutting 
the author’s career (see, for example, Wilson, 1978, pp. 1699-1700; 
Wright, 1970, p. 404; Goidon, 1977, pp. 342-43; Oppenheim, 1980, 
p. 7). In gross ethical violations, the referee may procrastinate or 
demand trivial revisions in order to delay publication until after the 
appearance of his own article on the same subject (see, for example, 
Rodman, 1970, p. 355; Meadows, 1977, p. 791). Or, if involved in 
related research, he may take unfair advantage of having early access 
to the author’s findings. He may even plagiarize the manuscript, 
a hilarious happening in Kingsley Amis’s college satire, Lucky  Jim, 
but deadly serious when it occurs in real life. “Who has not heard 
of or been the victim of a review in which a view that was ...antithetical 
to the reviewer’s preconceived notions or prejudices was suppressed 
merely by giving the article a bad review?” Harry C .  Nottebart, Jr. 
(1982), a physician, once demanded. “Who does not know of situations 
in which a reviewer has used data from someone else’s work that 
was being reviewed” (p. 480)? Finally, and perhaps most egregiously, 
a referee may turn the still-confidential information contained in 
a manuscript to immediate financial advantage, an increasing 
possibility in areas like biotechnology where many researchers have 
undisclosed links with business (see Maddox, 1984, p. 497; Vevaina, 
1987, p. 958). 
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All of these potential problems, however, from sex and race 
discrimination to conflict of interest, are reassuringly straightforward 
and probably very infrequent compared to the more subtle and 
pervasive controls imposed by peer review. Before we consider those, 
however, a simpler issue presents itself: are valid, reliable judgments 
even possible under peer review? 
Major Factors 
In any gathering of scholars where the conversation turns to 
peer t eview, stories will be told of incompetent reviews-careless, 
cursory, uninformed, uninformative-used to assault manuscripts 
representing months or even years of painstaking work (for examples 
of such stories, see Lindley, 1984, pp. 56-58; Commoner, 1978, p. 25; 
Wright, 1970, pp. 403-04; Glenn, 1976, pp. 179-80; Raza & Preisler, 
1985, p. 470; Sommers, 1983, p. 92; Engler et al., 1987. For a pointed, 
amusing satire of referees’ tactics, see, Remus, 1980). Astute reviews, 
which are rarely discussed, are probably more numerous. But the 
fact remains that, even allowing for authorial egotism, some very 
poor judgments seem to be made by referees and presumably cause 
at least occasional rejections. According to Robin and Burke (1987): 
“For some [medical] journals, even one unfavorable review may 
diminish the priority and result in disapproval” (p. 254). In James 
V. Bradley’s (1981) aforementioned survey of statisticians and 
psychologists, 74 percent asserted that for the most recent of their 
articles published in a refereed journal after compulsory revision, 
at least some factual errors were made by the referees; 42 percent 
of all respondents had found errors in important facts while another 
32 percent found only trivial errors. In addition, 67 percent claimed 
that at least some of the referees appeared not “to be at least as 
competent and sophisticated” in the article’s subject area as they, 
the authors, were; 40 percent said that at least some referees did not 
seem “to have read the article carefully” (p. 32). 
Editors try to avoid such problems by inviting high-status 
scholars to serve as referees in the belief that they know the most 
and will render the best reports. Thomas P. Stossel (1985), editor 
of the Journal of Clinical Investigation, carried out a fascinating 
experiment that stands this assumption on its head. Stossel counted 
review requests, analyzed the professional status of those to whom 
requests were sent, and evaluated the quality of completed reviews. 
He found that the highest-status scientists were the most likely to 
refuse his requests and, when they did comply, were the most likely 
to provide low-quality reviews. Conversely, the lowest-status scientists 
were likeliest to grant his requests and to write high-quality reviews 
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(pp. 658-59). His conclusions raise some alarm as high-status people 
routinely referee and their reports are routinely accepted and not 
scrutinized and assessed. 
Striking signs that something is amiss with peer review are the 
low levels of agreement among referees and, after publication, between 
referees and readers. That is, just about as often as not, those refereeing 
the same paper make different recommendations, and there seems 
to be no correlation between strength of referee endorsement and 
numbers of times cited after publication. In their survey of 138 refereed 
education journals, Smith and Gough (1984) asked editors to estimate 
“the percentage of manuscripts that provoked significant disagree- 
ment among the referees” and received answers ranging from zero 
to 90 percent with seventeen declaring that their referees rarely agreed 
(pp. 638-39). 
Nor are the social sciences unique. For instance, biological 
scientist-referees are said to show a rate of agreement about the same 
as would be reached through chance alone (Wilson, 1978, p. 1698). 
William C. Roberts (1987), editor of the American Journal of 
Cardiology, who uses two referees per submission, observes that i t  
is unusual for both to write “definitely accept” or “definitely reject,” 
and occasionally, perplexingly, one will write the first recommen- 
dation and one the second (p. 922). In the physical sciences, referees 
are much more consistent, presumably because their methodologies 
and rules of evidence are more firmly fixed, their research material 
by its nature more stable, and true objectivity is more easily attainable. 
However, even physicists and mathematicians tell of startling conflicts 
among reviewers (e.g., Lindley, 1984, pp. 57-58; Wallace, 1983, pp. 
11, 13; Thompson, 1983). 
In what is probably the most famous and controversial study 
ever conducted of peer review reliability, Douglas P. Peters and 
Stephen J. Ceci (1982) randomly selected one prestigiously-authored 
article published recently in each of twelve major psychology journals. 
They then changed the title and author’s name (but not gender) of 
each article, invented a low-prestige institutional affiliation, altered 
the abstract slightly, retyped the article, and submitted i t  to the journal 
where i t  had appeared. All were journals that made i t  a practice 
to reveal authors’ names to reviewers. In only three cases did any 
editor or referee recognize the article as previously published, and 
in eight of the remaining nine cases, the article was rejected. This 
suggests, of course, not only stunning unreliability in editorial 
decision-making, but the failure of referees to keep up  with the 
literature, the failure of editors to read even their own journals, and 
probably institution-based discrimination-though it is unclear 
whether authors from low-prestige institutions were being wrongly 
penalized or authors from high-prestige institutions wrongly favored. 
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Controversy swirled around the method, ethics, and significance of 
the Peters-Ceci study, but at the very least it raised questions about 
peer review that were difficult to dismiss. 
Two reasons are most often hypothesized to explain the system’s 
weaknesses-unmanageably heavy demand for referees and lack of 
concrete guidelines. Stossel’s ( 1985) study mentioned earlier, 
correlating reviewer status with review quality, suggests the first of 
these. The numbers of journals, journal pages, monographs, and grant 
proposals seem to have been growing faster than the number of experts 
with ample time to referee. A few of these numbers suffice to sketch 
the problem: Fifteen years ago, American Sociological Review was 
receiving about 800 manuscripts each year, American Journal of 
Sociology about 700, and together they needed 3,000 referees’ reports 
in order to dispose of the load (Glenn, 1976, p. 180). Eleven years 
ago, Physical Reuiew Letters was soliciting approximately 8,000 
referees’ reports each year (Adair, 1979, p. 101). In 1985, the Journal 
of the American Medical Association received 3,446 manuscripts, all 
of which were screened by the editors, 1,413 of which were refereed 
(Lundberg & Carney, 1986, p. 3286). Five years ago, Jay H. Lehr 
of Ground Water assured his readers that the journal’s referees were 
not overburdened: “No referee receives more than two papers a month 
[or] more than eighteen papers a year” (p. 148). One assumes that 
the readers were not reassured. It seems to take close to a full working 
day for thorough review of an exacting paper (see, for example, Carney 
& Lundberg, 1987, p. 87; Curtis, 1982, p. 9), and capable reviewers 
may have their opinion solicited regularly by more than one journal. 
On first consideration, the lack of written standards to serve as 
review guidelines seems much easier to rectify, and indeed many 
journals do supply them. However, they are hard to win agreement 
upon; hard to word specifically yet flexibly enough to cover all 
submissions; hard to formulate so as to yield valid judgments; hard 
to enforce; and almost certain to be variously interpreted (for examples 
of guidelines, see, Forscher, 1980, pp. 166-67; Bishop, 1984, pp. 59-
67). 
If, as seems true, substantial numbers of peer reviews are 
compromised by prejudice, ignorance, carelessness, hurry, or 
uncertainty or misapprehension about the journal’s values, many 
authors and many more readers are being arbitrarily denied 
opportunities to be heard and to learn. This, however, is not the 
greatest threat of peer review to intellectual freedom. Even when 
the system seems to work smoothly-perhaps especially when it does- 
i t  may subtly and harmfully control not only what is published and 
read but what phenomena are investigated and what ideas pondered. 
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RESISTANCE AND UNCONVENTIONALTO THE NEW 
The peer review process is inherently conservative because of 
the way reviewers are selected. Chosen by, and answerable to, an 
editor or editorial board (sometimes after consultation with colleagues 
or other reviewers), they are most often scholars with research degrees, 
affiliations with well-known academic or research organizations, and 
publishing histories of their own. The more famous and established 
they are, the more likely they are to be asked for reviews. Zuckerman 
and Merton (1971) discovered, for example, that: “Relative to their 
numbers, lower-ranking physicists do little refereeing altogether and 
also referee far fewer papers by the intermediate and highest ranking 
physicists than would be the case under a populistic allocation” (p. 
89). This is understandable, of course, but it guarantees that the vast 
majority of reviewers will have many years’ experience as students 
and employees of mainstream learned institutions, and probably as 
writers for refereed journals and as successful grant applicants. They 
will have absorbed the associated values and norms, acquired distinct 
theoretical and political perspectives, and formed opinions about the 
appropriate credentials for researchers and directions for research- 
they will have become, in other words, what Peter Gibson (1987) 
has called “the Enid Blytons of the scientific fraternity” (p. 63). 
However open-minded they strive to be, their judgments are bound 
to be shaped by powerful past influences and present expectations. 
That is, they not only have certain backgrounds but share them with 
those who request and receive the reviews, because scholarly editors 
are drawn from the same general population (though perhaps slightly 
more elevated ranks of it) as reviewers are (on referee selection, see, 
Stieg, 1983, pp. 102-05; Gordon, 1978). An interesting assertion was 
made by the editor of Journalism Educator when he initiated a 
refereeing system: “Manuscript reviewers will be chosen from the 
ranks of established scholars and professors who are likely to offer 
innovative ideas about the field” (Crook, 1988, p. 56). 
When consensus among reviewers, or even a majority “vote,” 
is required for acceptance of a manuscript, the tendency toward safe, 
unexceptionable decisions and avoidance of intellectual risk-taking 
is likely to be especially marked. And in high-rejection journals where, 
to use Zuckerman and Merton’s (1971) terms, the “decision-rule’’ is 
“when in doubt, reject” (p. 78), adventuresome manuscripts must 
be anathema. As a result, unconventional subjects and ideas, novel 
research designs, findings that challenge long-standing beliefs, and 
anything con troversial-even when persuasively presen ted-may find 
the road to print rough and darkened by shadowy obstacles. “Novelty,” 
states Dennis V. Lindley (1984), “is always on dangerous ground with 
referees” (p.57). Physicians Robin and Burke (1987) observe: “Almost 
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every expert reviewer has a conflict of interest; he or she represents 
their discipline as it now exists and unconsciously tends to defend 
i t”  (p. 254). And Barry Commoner (1978) warns: 
The peer review system threatens not so much the bulk of more routine 
research, but precisely those sweeping, novel advances that are thr 
growing points of science. Thr  real danger in the system is that it thrratens 
to blunt the cutting edge of scientific progress. (p. 29) 
Also, of course, this blunts progress and path-breaking exploration 
in the social sciences and humanities. Convincing research on the 
subject is difficult to plan and carry out since so many variables 
may affect what is finally a qualitative decision, but some investigators 
have made the attempt with provocative results. For example, 
Zuckerman and Merton (1971) found that high-status physicists were 
likelier than their intermediate- and low-status colleagues to have 
manuscripts submitted to Physical Review accepted at all, to have 
them accepted immediately, and less likely to have them rejected 
immediately (p. 91. See also, Crane, 1967). Of course, high-status 
authors may simply do better work than others, hcrice their high 
status. 
Steven H. Gale (1987), a literary critic with an axe to grind, 
subject analyzed twenty-two consecutive issues (1978-83) of the 
Publicat ions of t h e  M o d e r n  L a n g u a g e  Associat ion ( P M L A ) ,  
containing 146 scholarly articles, and concluded that, “the referees 
tend to look for the same kind of material that has already appeared 
in the journal ...” (pp. 4-9). (It is not irrelevant that Gale’s specialty 
is the contemporary English dramatist Harold Pinter and that his 
Pinter articles were rejected by P M L A ) .  There were, for example, 
disproportionate numbers of articles on pre-twentieth century 
English literature, on French literature, and specifically on 
Shakespeare and Chaucer. Largely neglected were drama and 
American literature-and only eight articles dealt with women writers 
of any country or period (Gale, 1987). The issue is not clear cut, 
of course: in an earlier P M L A  editorial, English Showalter (1984) 
had emphasized that what he published simply reflected what was 
submitted (for example, 46 percent of manuscripts received in 1973- 
83 dealt with English literature) (pp. 851-53)-though it does seem 
odd that, in the period Gale studied, so few manuscripts about 
women’s writing would have been submitted to one of the field’s 
most prestigious and broadly subject-defined journals. 
Michael Mahoney attracted considerable attention with his 
studies of social science journals which showed that experimental 
data and conclusions that supported conventional theory were much 
likelier to win referees’ approval than those that conflicted with it- 
and that articles citing work “in press” from the author were more 
often accepted than those that did not. “Even in science,” Mahoney 
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(quoted in Joyce & Pearce, 1986, p. 23) lamented, “nothing succeeds 
like success. Publication begets publication, recognition begets 
further recognition, and the rich get richer” (p. 23). It is the 
phenomenon that Robert K. Merton (1973) famously labeled “the 
Matthew effect.” 
In the American Council of Learned Societies’ 1985 survey of 
3,835 humanists and social scientists, 77 percent of the respondents 
asserted that the “peer review refereeing” systems in their fields were 
at least sometimes biased in favor of “scholars who use currently 
fashionable approaches” and “established researchers in a scholarly 
specialty.” Seventy-three percent believed that “scholars from 
prestigious institutions” were of ten or sometimes favored, and 37 
percent felt that “males” were favored. Women were likelier than 
men to detect “frequent” bias of any type (Morton & Price, 1989, 
pp. 69-71). (What was not asked was whether respondents saw the 
biases as justified. In a follow-up study of educators in ALA-accredited 
programs, 67 percent, 71 percent, and 67 percent of respondents 
perceived at least some bias favoring authors in the first three 
categories respectively, but several added marginal notes to the effect 
that discrimination in favor of the established and prestigiously 
employed makes sense [Biggs & Biggs, 19901.) 
Suffering most in such circumstances will be younger scholars 
without influential mentors, substantial bibliographies, or impressive 
institutional ties; writers in developing fields and new interdiscipli- 
nary specialties; intellectual innovators and rebels of all stripes; and, 
some suggest, authors reporting applied or apparently “simple” 
research. (See, for example, Grassman’s [19861 amusing critique of 
mathematical journals. Based on rejections of his articles on queueing 
theory, Grassman formulated “Joe’s theorem”: “Nothing is published 
in the area of queueing theory unless it is mathematically interesting. 
Nothing is applied in industry unless i t  is mathematically trivial. 
Since trivial results are not interesting, and since results that cannot 
be applied are not useful, nothing useful will ever be published in 
queueing theory” [p. 441.) 
Some may respond that there is no problem, that most papers 
rejected by prestigious journals will still find print, if their authors 
are persistent, through less-known, perhaps unrefereed, outlets. This 
is true (see, for example, Stieg, 1983, p. 115; Yankauer, 1982, p. 239 
[footnote]; Slater, 1984, p. 455; Rennie, 1986, pp. 2391-92). But i t  may 
be that in this age of bewilderingly prolific publication, to appear 
in an obscure journal, especially one that is not refereed, is to remain 
invisible and not really to “appear” at all. Unable to read every journal 
in their fields, scholars seek external clues to aid selection; among 
the most prominent are the related factors of a journal’s reputation 
and whether i t  is peer reviewed. Peer review is assumed to ensure 
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adherence to scholarly standards. When i t  doesn’t work well, readers 
are misled, as are academic search committees and tenure and 
promotion review groups. And authors who publish in unrefereed 
journals may suffer wrongly by comparison with their counterparts 
who publish in refereed, but not better, journals. 
IMPACTOF PEER REVIEW FREEDOM:ON INTELLECTUAL 
SUMMARY 
Through referee procrastination, carelessness, ignorance, or 
cupidity, peer review may deny authors the chance to publish in 
the most appropriate and widely read journals. And when authors’ 
names are revealed to referees or when referees can guess them, such 
essentially extraneous factors as authorial fame (or lack thereof), 
institutional affiliation, and sex may affect publication decisions. 
Even the most vocal defenders of peer review concede that i t  
penalizes innovation and nonconformity. Of course, this harms 
individual scholars, authors, and readers who are interested in the 
new. More broadly, it retards the advancement of knowledge, not 
only impeding progress but undermining hope of progress. For 
thoughts that cannot be voiced will less often be thought; subjects 
that cannot be published will virtually cease to be explored; and 
research approaches scorned will be abandoned. Self-censorship is 
necessary for the scholar wishing to succeed in academe. That this 
is so can largely be laid to the account of the peer review system. 
CONCLUSIONSAND RECOMMENDATIONS 
But what would we do without peer review? Unrestrained 
publication of everything, which is quite possible in the computer 
age and is advocated by some, would probably result in true 
publication of little. That is, as the flood of supposedly available 
information increased, ever less would actually be accessed and read. 
And a prestige ranking would surely emerge-probably based on 
criteria even less valid than presence of peer review-because scholars 
would have to find some way to differentiate among publications 
in order to choose which to read and how to assess colleagues’ 
credentials. 
In most unrefereed periodicals, manuscripts are screened but by 
an editor rather than referees. To substitute unaided editorial 
judgments for referee-assisted judgments in scholarly journals seems 
not an improvement and essentially absurd in an age of extreme 
specialization. Another possibility is to limit reviewing responsibil- 
ities to an editorial board of scholars in necessary specialties; they 
would be compensated, their names known, and their expertise and 
conscientiousness proven. At many journals, however, they would 
soon be overwhelmed by the volume of submissions, and the inherent 
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conservatism of peer review would only be enhanced if a small circle 
of people took charge of all decisions. Alternatively, such a board 
might divide responsibility, according to specialty, for screening 
manuscripts and selecting reviewers. Each specialist would then 
carefully read and evaluate the reviewers’ reports and make the 
decision to accept, reject, or request revisions. Constructive 
suggestions drawn from the reports could be conveyed to authors, 
with editors committing themselves to helping authors improve their 
manuscripts. 
Reviewers’ competence and care are crucially important and of ten 
criticized. Computerized referee files, which now are easy to set up, 
allow editors to store and retrieve large amounts of information on 
thousands of potential referees, thus drawing on the opinions of a 
far wider range of people than personal acquaintances and “invisible 
college” referrals can provide. Also, their performance can be 
monitored closely, with careless, uninformed, and dilatory referees 
identified at once and removed from file. Some editors have created 
huge databases of prospective referees through questionnaires and 
literature searches. Editorial involvement is the key: to selecting good 
referees, using their reports well, and guiding and controlling the 
entire process. 
Guidelines for peer review are probably necessary, though they 
are tricky to write and may shape and constrict referees’ thinking, 
thereby closing off spontaneous reactions and novel ideas. Certainly 
deadlines should be imposed on reviewers and self-imposed on editors. 
Though judging the authority of an anonymous manuscript can 
be difficult, the arguments for “blinding” referees are persuasive. 
And while people may indeed devote more care to reports that bear 
their names, revealing referees’ identities seems likelier to cause 
problems than to solve them. Younger and more vulnerable scholars, 
in particular, would either decline invitations to review or avoid harsh 
judgments of their seniors. This would only strengthen the grip of 
established scholars and ideas. Intelligent, sensitive editorial use of 
referees’ reports would circumvent most of the problems associated 
with reviewer anonymity. 
Among interesting possibilities are to encourage voluntary 
signing of reviews; to ask that authors suggest appropriate referees 
for the articles they submit as well as referees to avoid; and to publish 
symposium-style, immediately following an article, any particularly 
insightful referees’ reports (with their writers’ permission). 
Finally, though, editors and readers should realize that peer review 
is fundamentally hostile to intellectual invention and rebellion. It 
is the price we pay for reliance on established expertise-a necessary 
price, but a high one. 
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